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Notes
Applicability of the "General and Unper-
fected Lien" Doctrine to Contractual Liens
The United States Supreme Court in its 1958 per curiam deci-
sion in United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co. subordinated a
prior unrecorded contractual lien to a subsequenthj filed fed-
eral tax lien, characterizing the former "inchoate and unper-
fected." The author of this Note analyzes statutory and case law,
the facts of Ball, and the congressional policy on federal prior-
ity in order to determine what the Court meant by using those
words. He concludes that Ball should be interpreted as holding
only that a contractual lien will be subordinated to the federal
tax lien where the contractual lien has not met the ordinary
standards of commercial perfection.
I. IN RODUCTION
A TAXPAYER'S creditors may simultaneously include the
federal government, state and local governments, and secured as
well as unsecured commercial creditors. When the taxpayer lacks
sufficient funds to satisfy the maturing claims of all of his creditors,
the age-old problem of priority arises. At common law, priority
among similar, competing interests is guided by the cardinal princi-
ple "the first in time is the first in right." '
However, the claims of the Government for debts and taxes are
given preference over most competing creditors by two statutory
provisions: section 3466 of the Revised Statutes of 1875 and section
6821 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. Section 8466 provides:
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent ...
the debts due to the United States shall first be satisfied; and the priority
established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having
sufficient property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment there-
of, or in which the estate and effects of an absconding, concealed, or absent
debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in which an act of
bankruptcy is committed.2
1. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 85 (1954).
2. REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1952). Section 3466 affords the
Government a priority, not a lien. Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 299, 48 A.2d
210, 212 (1946). It covers all debts owing to the Government. However, it is
applicable only in the case of an insolvent debtor whose property 1as passed to
some third person, and arises as of the time of the transfer. Massachusetts v. United
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And section 6321 states:
If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after
demand, the amount... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon
all property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging
to such person.3
Neither section 3466 nor section 6321 indicates a congressional
intent to depart from the common law principle "the first in time is
the first in right" in order to defeat the rights of prior lienors. But in
County of Spokane v. United States,4 the Supreme Court held that
the section 3466 priority could defeat an antedating statutory lien,
because the latter was not "specific" or "complete. Two decades
later, in United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank,' in an obvious
attempt to create harmony between the treatment of a section 3466
priority and a federal tax lien, the Court applied the same standards
of specificity and perfection to defeat a prior statutory lien compet-
ing with a federal tax lien.
Until 1958, the tests of specificity and perfection had been applied
solely to defeat competing statutory liens. However, in United States
v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co.,6 the Court summarily reversed a holding
that a prior contractual lien outranked a subsequently filed federal
tax lien, by characterizing the former "inchoate and unperfected."I
The principal question raised by the Ball decision is whether or not
prior contract rights must meet the same tests of specificity and per-
fection required of statutory liens in order to defeat a subsequently
filed federal tax lien. The impact on secured creditors and legitimate
and recognized security transactions may be latent and dangerous
if an affirmative answer be reached.
States, 383 U.S. 611, 617 & n.8 (1948). It is unnecessary, for the applicability of
section 3466, that actual title to the property have passed; it is suflicient that the
debtor has been divested of possession of and control over the property transferred.
Bramwell v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 269 U.S. 483, 490 (1926).
3. INT. REv. CoDE or 1954, § 6321. Section 6321 creates a lien for tax debts, and
is applicable regardless of the taxpayer's solvency. See, e.g., United States v. Security
Trust & Say. Bank, 840 U.S. 47 (1950). Quaere whether the tax lien arises at the time
of demand, or at the time of assessment? Section 6322 provides that the lien arises
at the time of assessment. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 6322. But in United States v.
Lias, 103 F. Supp. 341 (N.D.W. Va.), aff'd, 196 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1952), it was
concluded that the lien arises only after both requirements have been satisfied. 103 F.
Supp. at 342. However, the tax lien is invalidated against mortgagees, pledgees,
purchasers, and judgment creditors unless notice of the tax lien has been filed. INT.
RErv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323.
4. 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
5. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
6. 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
7. Ibid. The Court's use of words such as "specific," "general," "Inchoate," and
"unperfected" frequently obscures the actual meaning of a decision. Clearly, "specific"
and "general" are antonyms, and "inchoate" and 'unperfected," referring to some-
thing incomplete, are synonomous. However, the Court has confused at least one
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Thus, it will be the purpose of this Note to resolve the above ques-
tion by tracing and analyzing statutory and case law involving ques-
tions of relative federal priority; by analyzing the facts of the Ball
case; and by determining and analyzing congressional intent under-
lying sections 3466 and 6321, and the pertinent provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act
H1. THE "GmEmAL Arm UN ERFECTEm Lm" DocwmnE AS ApprED
TO STATuTORY LIENs
A. TnE SECTON 3466 Pmiomry
The Court early declared that section 3466 was to be liberally
construed in favor of the Government,8 but interpreted the provision
merely to create a priority over other unsecured creditors. Thus,
from 1805 until 1929, it was the settled view that the section 3466
priority could not defeat antedating liens. 10 However, in 1929, the
Court applied a new, broader construction to section 3466.11 In
decision by attributing the tests of perfection to the requirement of specificity. The
tests of specificity are the following: the lienor must be identified, the amount of
the lien must be certain, and the property subject to the lien must be definite. In
addition, "perfection" has been said to require the lienor to divest the taxpayer-
debtor of title and possession. Thus, it would appear that the tests for specificity
and perfection are separable. However, in United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345
U.S. 361 (1953), the Court declared that "specificity' requires that the lien be
attached to certain property by reducing it to possession." Id. at 366. The question
is whether the Court implied that the tests for perfection include specificity, and
that specificity includes perfection. If so, then the words are redundant and the
tests for specificity and perfection are inseparable, and before a lien may be either
"specific" or "perfected," all of the tests must be met: the lienor must be identified,
the amount of the lien must be certain, the property subject to the lien must be
definite, and the lien must be reduced to title and possession. In its later decisions, the
Court has neither expressly adopted nor expressly rejected the language employed in
Gilbert. Thus, the question remains whether the tests of specificity and perfection are
separable. If not, then an "inchoate and unperfected" lien s met neither the tests of
specificity nor those of perfection. The above analysis becomes crucial in the discussion
and interpretation of the Ball decision, infra.
8. Beaston v. Farmers' Bank, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 102, 134 (1838).
9. See United States v. Hooe, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 73 (1805). In Conard v. Atlantic
Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386 (1828), the Court made it clear that the federal priority
was subordinated to an antedating, "specific and perfected lien." Id. at 444. Although
it is not indicated in any of the Court's subsequent opinions, this language may have
been the source of the -general and unperfected lien' doctrine. In Brent v. Bank of
Washington, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 596 (1836), the Court stated that a prior lienor was
not defeated by a federal priority. In this case, the Bank was the holder of notes
indorsed to it by Brent; when the Bank protested the notes for nonpayment after
maturity, its "legal lien . . . for their payment was complete." Id. at 615.
10. See cases cited note 9 supra.
11. See, e.g., County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929). For a
detailed historical analysis of the section 3466 priority, see Kennedy, The Relative
Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and
General Lien , 63 Y=re L.J. 905, 907-19 (1954). The first federal priority statute was
for customs duties. Act of July 31, 1789, § 21, 1 Stat. 42, re-enacted, Act of Aug. 4,
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County of Spokane v. United States,12 the Court held that liens
for county corporation taxes, which were assessed against the
debtor's personalty before he went into receivership and before the
section 3466 claim attached, were neither "specific" nor "com-
pleted," and thus were subordinate to the federal priority." The
counties' liens were neither "specific" nor "completed" because the
counties had not followed the necessary statutory procedure-
distraining the property subject to their liens- that would have
"completed" them.
This approach was clearly at variance with the Court's earlier
settled position. No reason for this departure was apparent. The
language of section 3466 had not changed, and there was no indi-
cation that Congress disagreed with the Court's original construc-
tion of the provision. The extent of the Court's departure became
clear only after subsequent decisions.
In 1941, in United States v. Texas,14 a federal claim under section
3466 was challenged by a state lien for gasoline taxes. Under state
law, the state's lien was "first and prior to any and all other existing
liens" on all property used by a gasoline distributor in his busi-
ness." And the state court held that the state's lien subordinated
the subsequent federal tax claim.'" However, the Court reversed,
concluding that the state's lien was not sufficiently specific or per-
fected when the federal claim arose. The property subject to the
state's lien was not "specific" or "constant," 17 and the amount of the
lien was "unliquidated and uncertain."' Furthermore, the state's
lien was "inchoate and general" because some judicial process
was still required to enforce the lien when the federal claim at-
1790, § 45, 1 Stat. 169. An act in 1797 provided for the settlement of accounts between
the United States and receivers of public money. Act of March 3, 1797, § 5, 1 Stat. 515.
This act was held to create a general priority for the Government, notwithstanding its
apparent limitation to receivers of public money. United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 358 (1805). However, the narrow references were deleted by the commis-
sion which compiled the Revised Statutes of 1874, and the priority section was
amended to read as it does today. MAcLAc-.AN, B m-RiupTcy 152 (1956).
12. 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
13. Id. at 94-95.
14. 314 U.S. 480 (1941).
15. Id. at 484. The Government's claim was for federal gasoline taxes. In Price
v. United States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926), the Court held that the word "debts" as
used in section 3466 included taxes. This holding presumably overrdes Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Johnson Shipyards Corp., 6 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1925), in which the lower
court declared: "A debt is not a tax, and a tax is not a debt." Id. at 755.
16. State v. Nix, 134 Tex. 476, 133 S.W.2d 963 (1939).
17. 314 U.S. at 487. The statute provided that the state's lien attached only
to such property as was "'devoted to or used in his business as a distributor,' rather
than his property in general." The Court regarded this language as vague.
18. Ibid. "[I]t was clearly envisaged that the amount of the taxes due, for which
the lien was security, should be left to determination by the [state] courts." Ibid. Thus,
the precise amount of the state gasoline taxes could not be determined, since the state
had not brought suit for collection through judicial proceedings.
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tached, since the lien "did not of its own force divest the tax-payer
of either title or possession." x9
In United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc.,20 the Court
held that a state court holding that a statutory landlord's lien was
"fixed and specific, and not . . . merely inchoate, -"2' although au-
thoritative of state law, was not controlling on the question of rela-
tive priority of competing liens, since this determination is "a mat-
ter of federal law."22 The Court then ruled that the landlord's lien
was not specific and perfected, because (1) it was not kmown on
the day the federal claim attached whether the landlord would as-
sert and insist upon his rights under his lien;23 (2) the amount
of the lien was uncertain;24 (3) the property subject to the lien
was indefinite, because the landlord could not enforce his lien
against more property than necessary to satisfy the claim for rent,23
and could not in any event assert his lien against property removed
from the premises for more than thirty days;20 and (4) the landlord
had not levied on the property, so that the taxpayer remained in
possession and retained title to the property in question. -
In Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell,2- the state had filed a lien
for unemployment contributions, thereby giving constructive no-
tice to all prior or subsequent parties, including bona fide pur-
chasers for value. The state sued to enforce its lien, and had a
receiver appointed. Thereafter, a section 3466 priority arose. The
Court affirmed a state court holding29 that the state's lien was sub-
ordinated to the Government's claim. Although the lienor was
identified, 30 and the amount of the lien was certain,3 ' the property
subject to the lien was indefinite.32 Furthermore, the Court stated
19. Id. at 488.
20. 323 U.S. 353 (1945).
21. United States v. Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 182 Va. 351, 363, 28 S.E.2d
741, 746 (1944).
22. 323 U.S. at 356-57. Compare "This is really a state question." County of Spokane
v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 94 (1929).
23. 323 U.S. at 357.
24. Id. at 357-58. "[I]t was . . . uncertain whether the landlord would ever assert
and insist upon its statutory lien. Until that was done it was impossible to determine
the particular . . . rent, or a proportion thereof, upon which the lien was based." Id.
at 357. "The landlord may have been mistaken as to the rental rate or as to payments
previously made.... " Ibid. Is it likely that a landlord would be "mistaken" as to the
periodic rental payments either with respect to amounts previously paid or as to rates?
25. Id. at 358.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 358-59.
28. 329 U.S. 362 (1946) (Justices Reed and Jackson dissenting).
29. People ex rel. Murphy v. Chicago Waste & Textile Co., 391 Ill. 29, 62 N.E.2d
537 (1945).
30. 329 U.S. at 375.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid. The lien attached to "all the personal property or rights thereto owned or
thereafter acquired . . . and used . . . in ... hs trade . . . or business." Id. at
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specificity and perfection required title and possession in the lien-
or,3 3 and noted that the appointment of the receiver was merely "an
initial step in the perfection of the lien."3 4 Moreover, the Court
concluded that recordation of the state's lien did not perfect it.35
In Petition of Gilbert Associates,6 the state court granted prior-
ity to a town tax lien which had been foreclosed by sale of the
property subject to the lien before the section 3466 priority for
taxes arose. However, in United States v. Gilbert Associates,"' the
Court reversed. Although the lienor was identified, the amount
of the lien was certain, and the property subject to the lien was
definite, the town's lien was said to be "general" and "unper-
fected" because "'specificity' requires that the lien be attached to
certain property by reducing it to possession."38
Thus, through case-by-case analysis, the Court drove a wedge
into the "first in time is the first in right" principle. The rule appli-
cable to statutory liens competing with section 3466 claims be-
came "the first specific and perfected in time is the first in right."
B. TBE FEDRAu TAx LmEN
The Court initially proceeded upon the stated premise that the
Government's lien for taxes attached "subject to the rights of other
lienholders" 39 or, "saving, of course, the rights of incumbrancers. ' 4 °
And so Government lawyers were not initially as successful in de-
feating statutory liens competing with the federal tax lien as they
had been in urging the subordination of such liens to the section
3466 priority.4' Lower courts consistently applied the principle
"the first in time is the first in right," and awarded priority accord-
372 & n.11. Under local law, it was required that the taxpayer file a schedule of all such
property. Id. at 373. However, the taxpayer had not filed such a schedule. Thus, the
state had no way of knowing with any degree of certainty to which property of the
taxpayer its lien attached, and the lien was, therefore, on "indefinite" property.
33. Id. at 376.
34. Id. at 374.
35. Id. at 374, 376.
36. 97 N.H. 411, 90 A.2d 499 (1952).
37. 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (Justices Frankfurter and Reed dissenting).
38. Id. at 366. Thus, the Court confused the tests for specificity with those of per-
fection and subordinated a completely "specific" lien, the holder of which had reduced
its claim to title to the secured property. Curiously, the Court was not presented with
the argument that since the town had title to the property in question, the debtor had
no "property rights" to which a federal priority could attach.
39. Blacklock v. United States, 208 U.S. 75, 87 (1908) (interpreting Mansfield v.
Excelsior Ref. Co., 135 U.S. 326 (1890)).
40. Id. at 88. For an excellent historical study and analysis of the federal tax lien
through 1954, see Kennedy, supra note 11, at 919-30. Courts and historians trace the
federal tax lien statute back to 1866. Government fiscal requirements expanded during
the Civil War, and tax collections were often frustrated by a transfer of a taxpayer's
assets before the Government instituted tax collection proceedings. Id. at 919-20 &
n.91. See also Detroit Bank v. United States, 317 U.S. 329, 334 (1943).
41. See, e.g., New York Cas. Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473 (N.D. Ill. 1944).
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ingly.42 In the late 1940's, however, the Government began press-
ing for the application of the "general and unperfected lien' doc-
trine to federal tax lien litigation.43 The reason behind this argu-
ment by analogy was clearly to bring tax lien litigation within the
rationale of section 3466 cases for the sake of uniform criteria
in both areas. However, this argument was lost on lower courts
which were unpersuaded by the necessity of harmony, and was
generally rejected."
In 1950, however, the Government carried its analogy argument
to the Supreme Court in United States v. Security Trust & Sao.
Bank.45 A creditor's attachment lien and subsequent judgment
straddled the filing of a federal tax lien. Under state law, since
the attachment lien was filed, the creditor could defeat the claims
of subsequent purchasers or encumbrancers.40 However, because
the attachment lien could be dissolved unless the attaching credi-
tor reduced his claim to judgment within three years,47 the Court
held that the creditor's lien was "mchoate."4 8 Moreover, the Court
specifically rejected the doctrine of relation back-merging the
attachment lien with the subsequent judgment, and allowing the
latter to relate back to the date of the former- to defeat federal
interests arising in the interval 49 Hence, the prior attachment lien
was subordinated to the federal tax lien, and the "general and un-
perfected lien" doctrine was adopted as the rule in federal tax
lien litigation for determining questions of priority between statu-
tory lienors and the Government.
Lower courts generally displayed stubborn resistance to the
Security Trust decision. For example, in Petition of Gilbert Asso-
42. When the federal tax lien was prior in time, the Government won. See, e.g.,
Cobb v. United States, 172 F.2d 277, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 1949); United States v. City of
Greenville, 118 F.2d 963, 966 (4th Cir. 1941). However, where the competing non-
federal lien was prior in time, the Government lost. See, e.g., In re Taylorerft Aviation
Corp., 168 F.2d 808 (6th Cir. 1948) (mechanic's lien); In re Casvcll Constr. Co.,
13 F.2d 667 (N.D.N.Y. 1926) (mechanic's lien); United States v. 52.11 Acres of Land,
73 F. Supp. 820 (E.D. Mo. 1947) (garnishment lien); United States v. Yates, 204
S.W.2d 399 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) (attachment lien). The Government lost to city,
county, or state tax liens in all of the following cases. United States v. Sampsell, 153
F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1946); United States v. O'Dell, 61 F. Supp. 966 (E.D. Mich. 1945);
In re Mt. Jessup Coal Co., 7 F. Supp. 603 (M.D. Pa. 1934); City of Winston-Salem v.
Powell Paving Co., 7 F. Supp. 424 (M.D.N.C. 1934); In re Wyley Co., 292 Fed. 900
(N.D. Ga. 1923). See Kennedy, supra note 11, at 924-25 & n.115.
43. See, e.g., Adams v. O'Malley, 182 F.2d 925, 928 (8th Cir. 1950); United States
v. Sampsell, supra note 42, at 734; United States v. Yates, supra note 42, at 405.
44. See cases cited note 42 supra. But see United States v. Bamdollar & Crosbie,
Inc., 166 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1948); United States v. Reese, 131 F.2d 466 (7th Cir.
1942).
45. 340 U.S. 47 (1950).
46. See Martinovich v. Marsicano, 150 Cal. 597, 89 Pac. 333 (1907).
47. 340 U.S. at 50.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid.
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ciates,50 the state court defeated federal tax liens by referring to the
town's tax lien as specific and perfected, and by calling the town a
"judgment creditor" within the notice-filing provision." The Court
reversed,5 2 concluding that (1) since the town had not reduced its
claim to tide and possession, its lien was "general" and "unper-
fected ;"53 and (2) the notice-filing provision envisages "judgment
creditors" in the "usual, conventional sense,"54 that is, holders of
judgments rendered by a "court of record."5
In United States v. City of New Britain," the city claimed that
its real estate tax and water rent liens took precedence over federal
tax liens, without reference to which was prior in time. A circuity
of liens problem was presented: two mortgages and a judgment
lien had been foreclosed before the federal tax lien arose, thereby
subordinating the Government's claim; however, under state law,
the city's liens took precedence over the mortgages and judgment
lien. The state court57 purported to find a congressional intent to
subordinate federal tax liens not only to mortgages and judgment
liens, but also to any lien superior to mortgages and judgment
liens.5" On appeal, the only question presented was the priority
between the city's liens and the federal tax lien, but the Court
acknowledged the Government's subordination to the claims of
the mortgagees and judgment lienor. 9 The Court vacated the state
court's holding that the federal tax lien was subordinated to both
the city's liens and the claims of the mortgagees and judgment
lienor, because the principle "the first in time is the first in right"
had not been applied. ° However, the Court guardedly admitted:
In the instant case, certain of the City's tax and water-rent liens appar-
ently attached to specific property and became choate prior to the at-
tachment of the federal tax liens.61
New Britain was clearly a departure from the monotony with
which the Court had previously disposed of competing statutory
50. 97 N.H. 411, 90 A.2d 499 (1952).
51. "[T]he lien imposed by section 6321 shall not be valid as against any inort-
gagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice thereof has been filed.
... " INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6323 (a).
52. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953) (Justices Frankfurter
and Reed dissenting).
53. Id. at 366.
54. Id. at 364.
55. Ibid.
56. 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
57. Brown v. General Laundry Serv., Inc., 139 Conn. 363, 94 A.2d 10 (1952).
58. Id. at 373-74, 94 A.2d at 15, citing Ferris v. Chic-Mint Gum Co., 14 Del. Ch.
232, 239, 124 AtI. 577, 580 (1924), and Board of Supervisors v. Hart, 210 La. 78, 93,
26 So. 2d 361, 366 (1946).
59. 347 U.S. at 88.
60. Id. at 85-86.
61. Id. at 86-87.
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liens. But even though the Government did not completely defeat
the city's liens, and the Court admitted that the claims of the
mortgagees and judgment lienor had priority, the "general and un-
perfected lien" doctrine survived.
In 1955, the Court held that an Ohio attachment lien,62 a Texas
garnishment lien,63 and a South Carolina distress lien 4 were "in-
choate" within the decision in Security Trust and were, therefore,
inferior to federal tax liens which were filed before the state-created
liens were reduced to judgments. In United States v. White Bear
Brewing Co.,65 a mechanic's lien for a specific amount was recorded
three months before the federal tax lien arose. But the federal tax
lien was filed before the lienor obtained judgment and sold the
property at a public auction. The lower court subordinated the
Government's claim,66 but, in a per curiam decision, the Court re-
versed.
C. SumiAY AND ANALYSis
The tests which a competing statutory lien must satisfy before it
may prevail over either a section 8466 priority or a federal tax lien
are clear. The lienor must be identified, the amount of the lien
must be certain, and the property subject to the lien must be
definite. In addition to this tri-parte test for specificity, the lien
must also be perfected, that is, reduced to title and possession.
Although recording a lien is normally sufficient to perfect it under
state law, the Court has rejected the argument that this is sufficient
to perfect a statutory lien competing with either a section 8466
priority or a federal tax lien. As long as a statutory lien remains
a lien, it will be subordinated to a federal claim under either sec-
tion 8466 or section 6321. Thus, "a [statutory] lien that is specific
and choate under state law, no matter how diligently enforced, can
never prevail against a subsequent [federal] tax lien, short of re-
ducing the lien to a final judgment." 7
Arguably, the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine is justi-
fiably applied to subordinate statutory liens competing with a fed-
eral tax lien. The notice-filing provision protects those interests
specifically designated "and no others."(8 In other words, Con-
gress has implied in the notice-filing provision that before a statu-
62. United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955).
63. United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955).
64. United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
65. 350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (Justices Douglas and Harlan dissenting).
66. 227 F.2d 359 (7th Cir. 1955).
67. United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010, 1011 (1956) (dis-
senting opinion).
68. United States v. Security Trust & Sav. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 53 (1950) (Mr.
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion). In United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218, 220
(1955), the Court appears to have adopted Mr. Justice Jackson's view.
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tory lienor can prevail over an unrecorded federal tax lien, his
claim must be reduced to a judgment, rendered by a court of rec-
ord. Thus, the federal tax lien is superior to statutory liens as of
the dates of demand and assessment. 9 Although the Court has
not expressly accepted the above analysis, clearly the conclusion
must be that the Court has at least been guided by it. Unfortunately,
the Court has been inconsistent. In New Britain, the Court con-
ceded that some of the city's liens were specific and choate. How-
ever, none of the city's liens had been reduced to title and posses-
sion, a deficiency fatal to the town in Gilbert Associates, decided
before New Britain, and to the lienor in White Bear, decided after
New Britain.
The Court's interpretation of section 8466, however, does not
find justification in the language of the provision. The section
states, in pertinent part, that debts owing to the Government "shall
first be satisfied," and refers to the Government's claim as a "prior-
ity."70 Thus, since section 3466 gives the Government a priority,
not a lien,7 the words of the provision only afford the Government
a preference over the claims of other unsecured creditors, and this
preference should not extend to encumbered property of the insol-
vent debtor.
Although there is little indication that Congress has considered
the problem, absence of remedial legislation may indicate that
Congress has adopted the Court's castigation of statutory liens, an
approach consistent with the treatment of state-created liens
in bankruptcy proceedings. Although such liens are expressly recog-
nized in the Bankruptcy Act,72 state-created liens on personalty,
unaccompanied by possession of such property are invalid against
the trustee in bankruptcy.1 3 Curiously, the Court has never used
this argument by analogy in either section 3466 or federal tax lien
69. See note 3 supra.
70. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
71. Meyer Estate, 159 Pa. Super. 296, 299, 48 A.2d 210, 212 (1946).
72. Bankruptcy Act, § 67(b), 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (1952),
recognizes that "statutory liens in favor of employees, contractors, mechanics, land-
lords, or other classes of persons, and statutory liens for taxes and debts owing to the
United States or to any State or any subdivision thereof ...may be valid against
the trustee. ...."
73. Bankruptcy Act, § 67(c), 66 Stat. 427-28 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1952),
provides as follows:
Where not enforced by sale before the filing of a petition initiating a procceeding
under this Act, and except where the estate of the bankrupt is solvent: ( 1 ) though
valid against the trustee under subdivision b of this section, statutory liens, includ-
ing liens for taxes or debts owing to the United States or to any State or any sub-
division thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession of such
property ...shall be postpone in payment to the ... [first two priorities
under section 64(a)(1), (2), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1), (2)
(1952)] ... ; and (2) .. . statutory liens created or recognized by the laws of
any State for debts owing to any person, including any State or any subdivi-
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litigation. However, another reason why Congress may be assumed
to have adopted the Court's requirement of specificity and per-
fection for competing state-created liens is that states should not
be permitted to impair federal standing to collect taxes by creating
liens which could defeat federal claims even though they attach
arbitrarily, at uncertain times, in uncertain amounts, and to in-
definite property. To allow states to do so would be to give efficacy
to the exercise of a power which states do not possess, absent con-
sent of Congress. The Court has suggested that the state-impair-
ment of federal standing may have motivated the adoption and
application of the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine in tax
lien litigation.74 It may be reasonable to assume that the same fear
of state-created liens was the underlying motive for the require-
ment of specificity and perfection in section 3466 cases.
Thus, the application of the doctrine to subordinate statutory
liens competing with federal tax liens is justifiable as a matter of
statutory construction. However, construction of section 3466 does
not support the application of the same doctrine in federal priority
cases. If the application of the "general and unperfected lien" doe-
trine to section 3466 litigation is justified at all, it can only be by
reference to analogous treatment of state-created liens in bank-
ruptcy proceedings and to rather abstract policy considerations.
IlI. CoNTRncTrruAL LENs AND =HE "GiNrAL AND UNPmEC
LmN" DocTRE
A. INTRODUCTMON
In United States v. Snyder,75 the question presented was 'vhether
the tax system of the United States is subject to the recording lavs
of the States."76 Deciding in the negative, the Court also neces-
sarily implied that a secret tax lien was valid against a subsequent
bona fide purchaser for value. Thus, in order to protect innocent
third parties from the operation of the secret tax lien, Congress,
in 1913, enacted an amendment to the tax lien statute which in-
validated the lien as against mortgagees, purchasers, and judgment
creditors until notice of the tax lien was ffled .7 Pledgees were added
to the list of notice-filing beneficiaries in 1939.18
sion thereof, on personal property not accompanied by possession of . . .such
property, shall not be valid against the trustee....
74. See, e.g., United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954).
75. 149 U.S. 210 (1893).
76. Id. at 213.
77. Act of March 4, 1913, ch. 166, 37 Stat. 1016, amending Rev. Stat. 3 186
(1875). As amended, this provision became Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 36, § 3672,
53 Stat. 449, and is now INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(a).
78. Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 401, 53 Stat. 882, amending Int. Rev. Code of
1939, ch. 36, § 3672, 53 Stat. 449. This provision is now found in INT. RL,. CODE OF
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The purpose of the notice-filing provision is clear. Congress in-
tended to protect legitimate and recognized commercial transac-
tions from castigation by a secret tax lien. The committee reports
make it patently clear that Congress intended to protect contractual
liens attaching priorm or subsequent to8° the tax lien; for example,
one report specifically states: "There is no reason why the Govern-
ment should not occupy the same position with reference to liens
on property as does the individual."81
B. Tim Ball CASE
In R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs,82 the facts, in chronological
order, were as follows: Ball entered into a contract for a housing
project in Texas and subcontracted a portion of the work to Jacobs.
As part of his contract, Jacobs was required to furnish a perform-
ance bond. On July 21, 1951, Jacobs applied to the United Pacific
Insurance Company for a bond payable to Ball. As consideration
for the Company's undertaking, not only on the Texas project, but
for "the payment of any other indebtedness or liability of . . .
[Jacobs to the Company], whether [t]heretofore or [t]hereafter
incurred,"8 3 Jacobs assigned to the Company all right, title and
interest to any sums then, or which might subsequently become,
due under the Texas subcontract. This instrument was executed
on July 23, 1951,84 but was never recorded.
On April 4, 1952, Jacobs applied to the Company for a similar
bond required under a subcontract in Kentucky. As part of the
consideration for the execution of this bond, Jacobs agreed to in-
demnify the Company against loss, and the assignment of the
proceeds on the Texas project was to be additional security for the
Company's undertaking."5
On April 30, 1953, a balance of $18,228.55 became due to Jacobs
on the Texas project, representing both progress payments and re-
tained percentages. In March and May of 1953, federal taxes were
1954, § 6323(a). The 1939 amendment also provided that mortgages, pledgecs,
and purchasers of "securities" were protected from the tax lien, even though filed,
until they had actual notice of the lien. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 3672(b) (1), (2),
53 Stat. 882-83, now found in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 6323(c) (1), (2).
79. H.R. REP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1912).
80. H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 25-26 (1939); S. Rr,. No. 648,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1939).
81. H.R. RP. No. 1018, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1912).
82. 140 F. Supp. 60 (W.D. Tex. 1956).
83. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587-88 (1958) (dissenting
opinion).
84. Brief for Respondent, p. 2, United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S.
587 (1958).
85. Such an agreement was actually unnecessary, as the bond furnished by the
Company on the Texas project explicitly covered future indebtedness. See note 83
supra and accompanying text.
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assessed against Jacobs. 86 Thereafter, in May, June, and Septem-
ber of 1953, notices of federal tax liens were properly filed. Jacobs
defaulted on the Kentucky project, and between December of 1953
and March of 1954, the Company was required to pay $12,971.88
on its performance bond. Ball instituted an action to determine to
whom the $13,228.55 should be paid, and the dispute was reduced
to a question of priority between the Company and the Govern-
ment.
The Company contended that none of the cases relied on by the
Government87 were controlling, since they involved "inchoate judg-
ment liens" which arose by virtue of some statutory, rather than
contractual, right. Moreover, the Company argued that its assign-
ment as collateral security was based upon a contract which was
prior in time to the federal tax liens, and that it was either a
"mortgagee, pledgee, or purchaser" within the notice-filing pro-
vision.8
8
The Government, on the other hand, argued (1) "if an attach-
ment or other judicial lien is not sufficiently 'choate' or complete
'to defeat a subsequent tax lien' then a mortgage to secure future
indebtedness should likewise be inferior to a subsequent tax lien ;"80
and (2) since the Company had not recorded its assignment, the
lien would not, even under state law, be binding against subse-
quent assignees or creditors, and, therefore, it could not be binding
against the Government"9
The district court held that the Company's lien prevailed over
the federal tax liens, concluding (1) that previous cases involving
the priority of competing statutory liens were not controlling; 91
(2) that the Company was "more nearly" a "mortgagee" within
the notice-filing provision;92 and (3) that the language of the
notice-filing provision was clear, and did not require that the mort-
gage be "due at a certain time and in a certain amount and ...
duly recorded in accordance with law." 3 On appeal, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed in a per curiam decision. 4
86. Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 5, United States v. R. F. Ball
Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958).
87. The Government insisted that the following cases were controlling: United
States v. Scovil, 848 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe
Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955); United States v. Acri, 848 U.S. 211 (1955); United
States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954); United States v. Gilbert Asso-
ciates, 345 U.S. 361 (1953); United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S.
47 (1950). 140 F. Supp. at 63.
88. ibid.
89. Id. at 65.
90. Ibid.
91. Id. at 63.
92. Id. at 64.
93. Id. at 65.
94. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 239 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1956).
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 91 and one commentator
stated:
The commercial world will await the outcome with extraordinary interest
because the Government's position, if successful, might subordinate a
widely used credit arrangement - an assignment of money, due or to
become due under an existing contract, as collateral security - such sub-
ordination being to a federal tax lien against the assignor, which tax lien
was not in existence when the assignment was made, but arose subse-
quently.9 6
In a per curiam decision, with four Justices dissenting,"7 the Court
held:
The judgment is reversed. The instrument involved being inchoate and
unperfected, the provisions of [the predecessor of section 6323 (a)] . . .
do not apply. See United States v. Security Trust & Savings Bank, 340
U. S. 47; United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U. S. 81, 86-87.08
Thus, for the first time, the Court subordinated a prior con-
tractual lien to a subsequently filed federal tax claim. Notwith-
standing the frustrating brevity with which a majority of the Court
dismissed the considered opinions of eight judges") concerning
such a vital question, there appear to be at least three possible in-
terpretations of the Ball decision; that is, the Company was not
entitled to the protection of notice-filing as a "mortgagee" because
(1) it was not a "mortgagee" in the usual, commercial sense; or
(2) even though a "mortgagee" in the commercial sense, it was not
a "mortgagee" for tax purposes, either (a) because the interest
created by the lien failed to meet the tests imposed by the "gen-
eral and unperfected lien" doctrine, or (b) because the Company's
lien failed to satisfy commercial standards of perfection.
(1) Was the Company a "mortgagee" in the usual, commercial
95. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 353 U.S. 956 (1957).
96. Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature and Effect of the Government's Weaponsfor Collection, 27 FoRDnAm L. REv. 1, 23 (1958).
97. Justices Whittaker, Burton, Douglas, and Harlan.
98. United States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587-88 (1958). The
Court's citation of Security Trust and New Britain presents a curious analytical
problem. Security Trust involved a subordinated statutory attachment lien, and
New Britain involved statutory real estate tax and water rent liens which were not
defeated by a federal tax lien. Thus, neither case could have been cited for the
proposition that contractual liens may be defeated by a subsequently filed federal
tax lien. Arguably, the citation of Security Trust was for the proposition that the
doctrine of relation back does not apply to unperfected statutory or contractual
liens where the effect would be to defeat a federal tax lien. The pages cited In Now
Britain discussed Security Trust and problems of inchoateness and relation back.
Thus, it seems clear that the cases cited merely support the proposition that the
doctrine of relation back will not apply to an unperfected contractual lien in order
to defeat a federal tax lien.
99. One district court judge, three Fifth Circuit judges, and four Supreme Court
Justices.
sense? The Court has declared that the terms "judgment creditor" 1 00
and "purchaser"' 01 are to be limited to their usual, conventional
meanings. However, the Court has not defined a "mortgagee" within
the notice-filing provision. Congress has similarly failed to provide
a definition of "mortgagee," but it is arguable that Congress in-
tended "mortgagee" to refer to a mortgagee of any sort and that
it should make no difference whether the mortgage is to secure
antecedent, newly acquired, or future debt, or whether or not the
mortgagor is left in possession. The Treasury Regulations state:
The determination whether a person is a mortgagee ... entitled to the
protection of section 6823(a), shall be made bi reference to the realities
and the facts in a given case rather than to the technical form or termi-
nology used to designate such person.'02
The Company, by virtue of the assignment as collateral security,
became an indemnity mortgagee, an "indemnity mortgage" being
one which is given to secure a surety on its contingent obligation" 3
The Company's mortgage was made to secure future indebtedness'04
which it agreed to assume on behalf of Jacobs on either the Texas
project or future projects. It is also possible that the Company's
lien was in the nature of a mortgage of after-acquired property,
since the assignment from Jacobs secured sums due or to become
due under the Texas subcontract Thus, to say that the Company
was not at least an indemnity mortgagee, and, therefore, a "mort-
gagee" in the usual, commercial sense, would be a failure to aclmowl-
edge realities.10 5
(2) When is a "mortgagee" a "mortgagee" within the meaning of
the notice-filing provision? Although the language of the notice-
100. United States v. Gilbert Associates, 45 U.S. 861, 364 (1953).
101. United States v. Scovil, 848 U.S. 218, 220-21 (1955).
102. Treas. Reg. § 801.682-1(a)(2)(ii) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
103. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 171 (1949) and cases cited therein.
104. The Government conceded that the Company was a "mortgagee" in at least
the usual, commercial sense, when it referred to the Company's lien as a mortgage to
secure future indebtedness. See R. F. Ball Constr. Co. v. Jacobs, 140 F. Supp. 60, 65
(W.D. Tex. 1956).
105. This is consistent with the Court's own interpretation of a similar arrange-
ment, when it said that an assignment of a chose in action as collateral security for
goods and returns "was . .. a mortgage of the goods, and the returns." Conard
v. Atlantic Ins. Co., 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 386, 447 (1828). But see Wolverine Ins. Co. v.
Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958), where the district court concluded
that the majority in Ball implied that the Company was not a "mortgagee" in the
usual and conventional sense. Id. at 351. This interpretation may be correct if a
"mortgagee" in the usual and conventional sense is defined as a person who also
holds a "choate" lien. However, the Court implied in Ball that the Company was a
"mortgagee" in the usual sense, and that but for features of inchoateness, the provi-
sions of section 3672-the predecessor of section 6323(a)-would have applied.
Furthermore, since the Court has never expressly or impliedly reversed the Conard
decision, it must be assumed that the Court's early interpretation of an assignment
of a chose in action as a mortgage is still law.
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filing provision is clear and appears to envision the holder of a
mortgage and nothing more, it is arguable that Congress at least
intended a "mortgagee" to be someone holding that kind of security
which gives the holder a priority over unsecured as well as subse-
quently secured creditors and bona fide purchasers for value. The
Court necessarily implied, in Ball, that it interprets "mortgagee"
to mean someone who is not only a "mortgagee" in the usual, com-
mercial sense, but also the holder of a "choate" and "perfected" lien.
Thus, the question is when is a mortgage or other contractual lien
"choate" and "perfected" so as to give its holder priority over prior
unsecured as well as subsequently secured creditors. The answer to
this question depends upon the answer to the question: Has the
Court in Ball (a) held that a contractual lien must satisfy the tests
imposed by the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine, or (b)
merely indicated that contractual liens must at least be "commer-
cially" perfected before the holder of a nonpossessory, contractual
lien is deemed a "mortgagee" entitled to the protection of notice-
filing?
(a) Has the Court in Ball held that a contractual lien must satisfy
the tests imposed by the "general and unperfected lien " doctrine?
There is no question that the doctrine could have been applied to
the facts of Ball so as to subordinate the Company's lien. If the in-
strument held by the Company was a mortgage of after-acquired
property, then the lien arose when the property came into existence,
subject only to existing liens. 106 Thus, the lien arose on April 30, 1953,
subject to the federal tax assessment made in March of 1953. Since
it was unknown in March when the sums would come into existence,
or, if so, in what amount, the amount of the Company's lien was
uncertain, and the property subject to the Company's lien was in-
definite. Furthermore, pursuant to the test of specificity, since the
Company had not been required to answer for a default on the
part of Jacobs before the tax liens were assessed and filed, it was
unknown whether the Company would ever assert or insist upon its
rights under its lien.
Since the Company was entitled to the balance due from Ball only
if and to the extent it was required to pay on one of its performance
bonds, it seems more likely that the Company held a mortgage to
secure future indebtedness, 10 7 that is, an indemnity mortgage. No
advance was made or required to be made until three months after
the last of the federal tax liens had been filed. Thus, the Company's
right to the balance due from Ball did not accrue until that time.
Moreover, the Company's lien was not founded on a present debt,
106. See OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 99 (1951).
107. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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but was made to indemnify the Company against a contingency
which might in fact never have occurred.108
However, the view among the authorities is that where there is
no debt or advancement made by the mortgagee prior to the per-
fection of a subsequent lien, but the mortgagee is unconditionally
obligated to make a subsequent advance pursuant to an indemnity
mortgage contract, the mortgagee's lien relates back, for priority pur-
poses, to the time when the mortgage was executed.108 Applied to
Ball, this view indicates that although the Companys lien was
general when the tax liens were filed, the lien became specific
when the Company was required to pay on the Kentucky per-
formance bond, and, for priority purposes, related back to the
date on which the mortgage was executed. Thus, the Company's
lien, by relation back, antedated the tax liens by nearly two years.
However, the Court has consistently refused relation back in cases
involving competing statutory liens,110 and in Ball the Court refused
to allow the Company's contractual lien to relate back to the date
of execution.111
But even assuming arguendo that the Company's lien was specific,
was it also fully perfected? The Court has stated that before a
statutory lien is perfected the lienor must have divested the tax-
108. The Ball case has been interpreted to stand for the proposition that:
[The] federal tax lien will prevail over a previous assignment to secure a
contingent obligation if the event against which the assignee sought protec-
tion had not occurred when the federal tax lien arose and this upon the theory
that until such event arose the assignment was inchoate and unperfected.
Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phillips, 165 F. Supp. 335, 350 (N.D. Iowa 1958). Writing
under an appropriate title, one commentator stated:
If the effect of the Ball decision reached no further than to affect the rights
of sureties under indemnifying agreements, it would cause enough discomfort.
But the implication of the decision goes far beyond the narrow issues which were
decided. It throws doubt upon those cases in which mortgage holders may make
optional advances... [for taxes and so on in order to protect the secured prop-
erty]. Whether or not such payments will become necessary or will be made at
all is entirely speculative at the time the mortgage instrument is executed.
Heron, Federal Tax Claims Again, or Devastation Revisited, 26 INs. CocsEL. J.
112-13 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
109. See 3 GLExN, MORTGAGES, § 402 (1943); 4 Po.nmoy, EQUrr JuRIs~unENCE,
§ 1198 (5th ed. 1941).
110. See, e.g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956);
United States v. Colotta, 350 U.S. 808 (1955); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211
(1955); United States v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 215 (1955);
United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955); United States v. Security Trust & Say.
Bank, 340 U.S. 47 (1950). Contra: Vincent v. P. R. Matthews Co., 126 F. Supp.
102 (N.D.N.Y. 1954); United States v. Crosland Constr. Co., 120 F. Supp. 792,
795 (E.D.S.C. 1954); American Fid. Co. v. Delaney, 114 F. Supp. 702, 710 (D.
Vt. 1953); American Sur. Co. v. City of Louisville Municipal Housing Comm'n, 63
F. Supp. 486 (W.D. Ky. 1945); New York Cas. Co. v. Zwerner, 58 F. Supp. 473
(N.D. Il. 1944). None of these district court cases were reviewed by the Supreme
Court.
111. See note 98 supra.
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payer of title or possession," 2 or perhaps both. a If the same test be
applied to the Company's contractual lien, then clearly its lien was
not perfected at the time the federal tax liens arose and were filed,
because the Company had not reduced its lien either to title or pos-
session.
Thus, the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine could have
been applied to subordinate the Company's lien, but the question
remains whether the doctrine was applied. An argument can be made
that the Court did apply the doctrine to geld the Company's lien.
First, the words "inchoate" and "unperfected" have been used only
in cases involving the subordination of competing statutory liens.
Arguably, therefore, the Court may have indicated its application
of the doctrine to a contractual lien in Ball through the use of those
words. Secondly, the cases cited, Security Trust and New Britain,
involved the question whether competing liens were "specific" and
"perfected." Thirdly, the dissenting opinion in Ball did not specifi-
cally refute the notion that a majority of the Court had applied the
doctrine to the facts involved. Rather the opinion dealt with an
argument that not only was the Company's lien a "mortgage," per-
fected on its date so as to entitle the Company to protection as a
"mortgagee" within the notice-filing provision, but also that the cases
cited by the majority were not controlling. Even in dissent, four Jus-
tices tacitly resigned themselves to the supposed fact that the ma-
jority had applied the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine to
castigate the Company's contractual lien, and some lower courts
were similarly persuaded."4
112. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 361, 366 (1953);
Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 376 (1946); United States v,
Waddill, Holland & Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 358 (1945); United States v. Texas,
314 U.S. 480, 488 (1941).
113. There is some question whether the requirements of title and possession are
conjunctive or disjunctive. In United States v. Gilbert Associates, 345 U.S. 301
(1945), although the town had a tax title, it had not reduced its lien to possession.
The Court stated that "specificity" required that the taxpayer be divested of pos-
session, and concluded that the town's lien was "general" and "unperfected." Id.
at 366. However, in New Britain, the city had reduced its lien to neither title nor
possession, yet had a "choate" lien. Thus, quaere whether title and possession are
actually required if the lienor has an otherwise "specific" lien? Gilbert Associates
implies that a lien is not even specific unless the lienor has reduced his claim to
title and possession; however, New Britain merely indicates that a lien may be
"specific" and "choate" regardless of whether the lien has been reduced to title
or possession. Subsequent cases tend to follow the approach that a statutory lien
must meet tests of both specificity and perfection, and that either alone is insufficient.
See, e.g., United States v. White Bear Brewing Co., 350 U.S. 1010 (1956).
114. In First State Bank v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 204 (D. Minn. 1958), the
district court construed Ball to mean that "an assignment . . . [does not constitute]
a mortgage within the meaning of" the notice-filing provision. Id. at 210. The
lower court apparently confused "perfection" with specificity" in its analysis of
Ball. See generally id. at 208-10. This is not inconsistent with the Court's predica-
ment in the Gilbert decision. See notes 7 & 113 supra. In Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phil-
However, considering the effects of applying the doctrine to con-
tractual liens, a more persuasive argument may be made that the
Court did not apply the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine
to the facts of BaU. The justifications that may exist for subordination
of statutory liens to Government claims"15 do not apply to con-
tractual liens. Furthermore, practically no contractual security in-
terest in property satisfies the Court's tests of specificity and per-
fection heretofore limited to statutory liens. Until a mortgage is ter-
minated by payment, it is normally unknown whether the mortgagee
will assert and insist upon his rights under his lien. The property
subject to a mortgage may frequently be indefinite, as when the
mortgage covers after-acquired property, accessions, or a shifting
stock of goods. Furthermore, it is usually unknown in advance how
much of the mortgaged property will be needed to satisfy the mort-
gagee's claim in the event the mortgagor defaults.
The amount of the secured debt is frequently unliquidated and
uncertain, as when the mortgage covers future advances. Moreover,
although the mortgagor will normally pay all or at least part of the
secured debt, there may be disagreement over the amount or appli-
cation of payments. And if the mortgagor pays the debt before ma-
turity, the total amount of the debt will be reduced to the extent
of interest payments saved.
The modem mortgage does not of its own force and effect divest
the mortgagor of title or possession, although in some states the
mortgagee is said to have title. "' Unless legitimate and recognized
mortgage transactions are to be completely subordinated to subse-
quent federal claims, it is absurd to require a mortgagee to reduce
lips, 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958), the lower court declared that after
Ball it is "clear that the ... Court will apply the specific and perfected test to liens
which compete with federal tax claims whether such competing liens are statutory
... or contractual!" Id. at 850. (Emphasis added.) Curiously, the lawv reviews
generally accepted the above interpretation of Ball, although not without reluctance.
See, e.g., 27 FonHAm L. REv. 284 (1958); 33 ST. Jonts L. REv. 157 (1958). One
case note insisted that the rationale of Ball turned on the Company's failure to file
its lien. See 10 AL. L. REv. 462 (1958), discussed in note 143 infra.
115. See "C. Summary and Analysis" supra.
116. In title theory states, the mortgage transaction places title in the mortgagee,
that is, the mortgage is in form an absolute conveyance defeasible upon the hap-
pening of a condition subsequent. And the condition subsequent is either pay-
ment of the secured debt or the performance of an act. In Minnesota, the law is
somewhat confused, although our court has adopted the above analysis of the
mortgage transaction. See, e.g., Land O'Lakes Dairy Co. v. County of Wadena &
State, 229 Minn. 263, 39 N.W.2d 164 (1949). In lien theory states, the mortgage
transaction places title in the mortgagor, and by recording the security instrument,
the mortgagee is given a lien on the secured property. For a detailed classification
of the title and lien theory states, see 5 TitrA-Y, RE.AL PnoPmrrr 1380 (3d ed. 1939).
If a mortgagee is deemed to have title to the mortgaged property, then there is no
question that the "general and unperfected lien' doctrine would have no application,
for the taxpayer would have no "property" or "rights to property" to which the
federal tax lien could attach. See note 143 infra.
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his lien to title and possession in order to perfect it, since contrac-
tual liens are normally perfected either by filing the security instru-
ment, or by taking possession of the secured property. But for tax
purposes filing is insufficient to perfect a statutory lien, and posses-
sion without title is also probably inadequate. Pledgees generally
have possession, but not title. Mortgagees generally do not have
possession, and will have title only in "title theory" states.
If contractual liens must be "specific" and "perfected" to qualify
their holders as "mortgagees" or "pledgees" within the notice-filing
provision, the impact on security transactions may be latent and dan-
gerous. For example, lenders will be more reluctant to enter into
legitimate security transactions with borrowers who incur large
annual tax debts or those who are unable to provide additional se-
curity. However, commercial lenders could establish blanket inter-
est rate increases, or could charge higher rates to borrowers who
are unable to provide sufficient additional security. Presumably, bor-
rowers with high annual tax liabilities may be in a position to give
additional security of a fixed, definite character, so that financing
institutions may be willing to extend credit to them at present in-
terest rates. However, borrowers with the greatest need for secured
financing may be in no position to provide such additional security
or incur higher interest rates. Thus, security transactions could be
seriously curtailed.117
Perhaps the Government must be given an absolute preference
over the property of delinquent taxpayers to give efficacy to proper
administration of federal tax laws in order to assure that federal
taxes will be collected. However, when Congress enacted the Bank-
ruptcy Act, it did not consider an absolute priority necessary. In
bankruptcy proceedings, the federal tax lien must be accompanied
by possession or be enforced by sale before bankruptcy unless it
applies to realty, or be deferred to the payment of claims entitled
to the first two "priorities."" 8 If the federal tax lien is on personalty
117. If commercial perfection is the test, holders of commercially perfected liens
might further protect themselves from subsequently filed federal tax liens through
the "no property" argument. See note 143 infra.
118. Bankruptcy Act, § 67(c)(1), 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)
(1952). Although there are only five degrees of priority, there are actually several
more classes of prior claims. The claims which are entitled to the first priority may
be summarized as follows: (a) necessary expenses of maintaining the estate after
the petition has been filed; (b) filing fees not paid by the bankrupt; (c) fees for
the referees' salary fund; (d) fees for referees' expense fund; (e) costs incurred by
creditors in recovering assets for the bankrupt estate; (f) costs and expenses of ad-
ministration, including the trustee's expenses incurred in opposition to a discharge
or prosecuting a crime relating to bankruptcy; (g) witness lees; (h) attorneys' fees
for the petitioning creditors; and (i) attorneys' fees for the bankrupt. See Bankruptcy
Act, § 64(a)(1), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1952). The second
priority is restricted to claims for wages. However, this priority is restricted, both
as to the amount-$600-and with regard to the time when the wages were earned
and is accompanied by possession, or has been enforced by sale
before bankruptcy, it is satisfied from the bankrupt's assets before
the claims of those entitled to priorities under the act However, the
lien is subject to the "first in time is first in right' principle with re-
spect to competing liens." 9 Thus, if a contractual lien is perfected
before the Government perfects its tax lien, the former is given
priority. If the federal taxes are not liens, they have only a fourth
priority over the residue of the bankrupt's unencumbered assets, -120
and all claims arising under section 3466, other than taxes, are rele-
gated to the fifth and last priority,121 and are likewise satisfied only
from unencumbered assets. Since Congress has subordinated federal
claims to perfected contractual security interests in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, there is a strong argument that it would not withdraw the
ordinary preferred position from contractual lienors in nonbank-
ruptcy proceedings without expressly so providing.2'
In the notice-filing provision, Congress has expressly protected
mortgagees, pledgees, and purchasers from the operation of the
secret tax lien, and it is probable that the underlying congressional
intent was to give broad protection to such persons from interfer-
ence with their legitimate and recognized commercial transactions.
The application of the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine to
contractual liens would do violence to such an intent, and virtually
castigate most secured credit arrangements in favor of subsequently
arising federal claims for debts or taxes.
The Court must have known of the mechanics of security trans-
actions and that few, if any, contractual liens could meet the tests
of specificity and perfection. Then the Court must have recognized
that the application of the "general and unperfected lien" doctrine
would have latent and dangerous effects on legitimate commercial
transactions, and that business practices generally would be serious-
ly curtailed. Furthermore, it is probable that the Court was aware
of the protective congressional intent inherent in the notice-filing
provision as well as the relative treatment of federal claims and
contractual liens in bankruptcy proceedings. Thus, it is probable
that the Court applied a more reasonable test of perfection, one
more closely allied with congressional intent and commercial prac-
tices, which the Companys lien failed to satisfy.12
-within three months of bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act, § 64(a)(2), 52 Stat.
874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(2) (1952).
119. See California State Dep't of Employment v. United States, 210 F.2d 242(9th Cir. 1954).
120. Bankruptcy Act, § 64(a)(4), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4)
(1952).
121. Bankruptcy Act, § 64(a)(5), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(5)
(1952).
122. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
123. But see notes 108 & 114 supra and cases discussed therein.
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(b) Has the Court in Ball merely indicated that contractual liens
must at least be "commercially" perfected? The Court referred to
the Company's lien as "inchoate and unperfected." The determina-
tion of relative priority between federal claims and competing
statutory liens was initially said to depend upon whether the com-
peting lien was "specific" and "completed" when the federal claim
attached.'24 Thereafter, "completed" was changed to "perfected."''12
Subsequently "choate" was adopted.12 The tests for specificity and
perfection are clear. Before a lien is "specific" the lienor must be
identified, the amount of the lien must be certain, and the property
subject to the lien must be definite. A statutory lien is "perfected"
when it has been reduced to title and possession. Literally, the tests
for specificity and perfection are separable. "Specific" and "choate"
are not synonomous. But since "inchoate" means "incomplete," and
"unperfected" means "not brought to completion,"1 2T the phrase
"inchoate and unperfected" is literally redundant. If "perfected"
does not include "specific," then the tests of "choateness" and "spe-
cificity" are also separable.12 8
Arguably, therefore, since the Court held that the notice-filing
provision did not apply to the Company's lien in Ball because it was
"inchoate and unperfected," the Company's lien was subordinated
because it was "incomplete," not because it was "general." If a con-
tractual lien must be "complete" before its holder is a "mortgagee"
or "pledgee" within the notice-filing provision, the question arises
as to how and when such a lien is normally "completed."
Since Congress failed to specify a requirement of perfection for
the beneficiaries of notice-filing, it may be that by referring to a
"mortgagee" Congress merely had reference to the holder of a con-
tractual, nonpossessory security interest in property, and nothing
more. This construction, however, leads to the curious conclusion
that a security interest binding against no one under state law
except the immediate parties thereto, as in Ball, may be binding
against the Government.'29 Even assuming that Congress intended
to give broad protection to the beneficiaries against interference with
their legitimate security transactions, there is little justification for
assuming further that Congress deemed it necessary to go that far
in order to give mortgagees and pledgees necessary protection.
Congress more likely intended that "mortgagee" refer to a person
who is not only a "mortgagee" in the usual, commercial sense, but
124. County of Spokane v. United States, 279 U.S. 80 (1929).
125. New York v. Maclay, 288 U.S. 290, 293 (1933).
126. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 50 (1950).
127. MmauA-WEsT'n, NEw INTERNATioNAL DiaroN~ny (2d ed. 1957).
128. But see note 7 supra.
129. This seems to be the conclusion reached by the dissenting opinion. United
States v. R. F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587, 594 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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also the holder of that kind of security interest which protects the
holder against the claims of prior unsecured as well as subsequently
secured creditors. The holder of a security interest normally obtains
that degree of protection either by filing the security instrument or
by taking possession of the secured property.130
This is consistent with the manner of perfecting a contractual
security interest under the Bankruptcy Act. Congress has provided
in the preference section of the act that a contractual interest in
personalty is deemed perfected when no subsequent lien upon the
same property could be obtained which could create rights superior
to those of the original lienor.131 If realty is involved, the contractual
interest is deemed perfected when no subsequent bona fide pur-
chaser from the debtor could gain rights in the realty greater than
those of the original lienor13 2 And a person may so perfect his
rights either by filing his security instrument or by taking posses-
sion of the secured property, depending upon requirements under
state law. 33
State laws vary as to the time allowed for a lienor to file or take
possession. In some states, a grace period is allowed. Thus, in such
states, the interest must be perfected by filing the security instru-
ment or by taking possession within a specified number of days
after the contract is executed,134 or creditors or lienors who become
such during the interval take priority regardless of later perfection.
In states where there is no grace period legislation, one of two views
prevails: either the lienor is given a "reasonable time" after execu-
tion of the agreement within which to perfect his interest, 35 or the
lienor's security interest is void against subsequent parties until per-
fected by filing or by taking possession of the property.130 Some
states have a combination of grace period and no grace period leg-
islation. For example, in Minnesota, holders of trust receipts are
130. See, e.g., MINi. STAT. § 511.01 (1957).
131. Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a)(2), 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2)
(1952).
132. Ibid.
133. Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a)(6), (7), 64 Stat. 25-26 (1950), 11 U.S.C. §
96(a)(6), (7) (1952).
134. See, e.g., ILL. Bzv. STAT., ch. 95, § 4 (1957) (20 days); ME. STAT. ANN., ch.
178, § 1 (1954) (20 days).
135. The Courts cannot agree on what constitutes a "reasonable time." Matter
of Paramount Finishing Corp., 259 N.Y. 558, 182 N.E. 180 (1932) (6 days be-
tween delivery and filing was not unreasonable); in Mitschele-Baer, Inc. v. Living-
ston Sand & Gravel Sales Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 286, 154 At. 752 (1931), the mortgage
papers traveled five times through the mails to cure formal defects, and 12 days
between execution and recording was not unreasonable. However, where the
mortgage was received by the recorder 5 days after execution, but was not recorded
until the recording fee arrived 10 days later, it was held that the delay was un-
reasonable. In re Kessler, 90 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D. Cal. 1950).
136. See, e.g., MmN. STAT. § 511.01 (1957) (chattel mortgages); MWN. STAT.
§ 511.18 (1957) (conditional sales contracts).
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allowed thirty days13 7 within which they must record their interests
and holders of factor's lien contracts are allowed fifteen days" 8
within which to record. The statutes regulating conditional sale con-
tracts139 and chattel mortgages 140 do not specify a stated time for re-
cordation, and both security interests are void against subsequent
parties until recorded. Assignments of accounts receivable have been
validated by statute in Minnesota,' 4' and need not be filed to be
valid against subsequent parties.
Because of the variation among states as to how and when a con-
tractual lien is perfected, two problems remain. The first problem is
whether in a grace period or "reasonable time" jurisdiction a federal
tax lien filed during the interval between execution and commer-
cial perfection of the contractual lien will take priority over the
latter. If the principle "the first in time is the first in right" is strictly
applied, the federal tax lien should prevail, although the contractual
lien will be valid against creditors or lienors becoming such in the
same interval if the contractual lien is perfected within the grace
period or "reasonable time" allowed. Although the Bankruptcy Act
allows relation back with certain restrictions,'42 the notice-filing
section makes no such provision. The second problem is whether
security interests which are validated by state law without re-
cordation will subordinate subsequently filed federal tax liens. If
the bankruptcy test of perfection is the standard, such interests are
perfected when executed. However, it is suggested that the notice-
filing provision be amended to provide that such security interests
be invalid against subsequently filed federal tax liens unless notice
137. MINN. STAT. § 522.07 (1957).
138. MiNN. STAT. § 514.83 (1957).
139. MINN. STAT. § 511.18 (1957).
140. MIN. STAT. § 511.01 (1957).
141. MINN. STAT. § 521.02 (1957).
142. Bankruptcy Act, § 60(a)(7)(I)(A), 64 Stat. 26 (1950), 11 U.S.C. §
96(a)(7)(I)(A) (1952), provides that where state law allows a specific period of
not more than twenty-one days after the execution of a security agreement within
which to perfect such agreement, and the lienor perfects within such stated period,
the date of perfection relates back to the date of execution. Hence, in Minnesota,
factor's lien contracts must be perfected within fifteen days of the date of execution
to entitle the holder to relation back for bankruptcy purposes, However, Bankruptcy
Act, § 60(a)(7)(I)(B), 64 Stat. 26 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(7)(I)(B) (1952),
provides that where state law specifies no such period, or specifies a period of more
than twenty-one days within which a security interest must be perfected, and thi
interest is perfected within twenty-one days, then the date of perfection relates back
to the date of execution for bankruptcy purposes. Applied to Minnesota law, since
neither chattel mortgages nor conditional sales contracts are allowed a specified
period within which to be perfected, the holder of either interest will be entitled
to relation back if he records or otherwise perfects, as by taking possession, within
twenty-one days after execution of the contract. The holder of a trust receipt, on
the other hand, must perfect his interest within twenty-one days after execution
of the trust receipt agreement.
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of the lienor's interest is first filed with the local Director of Internal
Revenue.
Thus, "any mortgagee" probably refers to a person holding a
nonpossessory, contractual security interest in property, by refer-
ence to the realities of the situation, the mechanics of the transac-
tion and commercial construction of the transaction, whose lien has
been perfected either by filing the security instrument or by taldng
possession of the secured property so as to protect himself from the
claims of subsequent parties. Even though the Company in Ball
was a "mortgagee" in the usual, commercial sense, it was not a
"mortgagee" with that kind of security required by commercial
lenders in general, because by failing to record its interest the Com-
pany held a claim binding only between the immediate parties.
The Court properly determined that the Company's lien was in-
choate and unperfected" until after the federal tax liens were filed,
and accordingly subordinated the Companys mortgage to the Gov-
ernment's claim for delinquent taxes. The rule of the Ball case may,
therefore, be stated as follows: Unless a nonpossessory, contractual
lien is perfected in the commercial sense, a subsequently filed fed-
eral tax lien will be given priority pursuant to the "first in time is first
in right" principle."
143. It has been suggested that the Internal Revenue Service is of the opinion
that a purchase money mortgage recorded after a federal tax lien has been filed
should be given priority. Cross, supra note 96, at 23, citing Mosner, The Nature and
Scope of Federal Tax Liens, 17 MD. L. REv. 1, 7 n.25 (1957). Similarly, a conditional
sale contract subsequent to a recorded federal tax lien was given priority. United
States v. Anders Contracting Co., 111 F. Supp. 700 (W.D.S.C. 1953). The subordi-
nation of the federal tax lien in both cases is justifiable on the ground that a purchase
money mortgagee and conditional vendor have first claims to the property in ques-
tion when it enters the possession of the mortgagor and the vendee. Thus, the
Government has merely a junior lien in both cases, clearly inferior in time and
right to the claims of the mortgagee and vendor.
If the Company in Ball had commercially perfected its lien, the irgument could
have been made that the assignment from Jacobs divested him of aft tide to the
sums due or to become due; that since Jacobs had been divested of all title with
respect to the property, Jacobs had no "property" or "rights to property" to which
the subsequently filed federal tax lien could have attached. The question whether
Jacobs had a property interest to which the tax liens could have attached would de-
pend upon his right to recover the sums under state law, since it has been expressly
held that: "classification of interests is a federal question; the existence of the inter-
ests to be federally classified, however, is solely a question of state law." Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority, 241 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1957).
(Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court has apparently adopted this view. See
United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958), where the Court declared: "section 3670
[the predecessor of § 6321] creates no property rights but merely attaches conse-
quences, federally defined, to rights created under state law... [citing the Fidelity
case]."Id. at 55. Lower courts have developed the "no property" theory by which
competing contractual, as well as statutory, liens have been given priority over fed-
eral claims without reference to either the eral ral and unperfected lien" doctrine
or to commercial perfection, since a decision can be made in favor of the competinglienor as soon as it is determined that the taxpayer had no "property" or "rights to
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Originally, the Government had priority among unsecured credi-
tors under section 3466, and an ordinary lien for delinquent taxes
under the predecessors of section 6321. Both statutory provisions
were initially construed to attach subject to the rights of antedating
lienors, whether statutory or contractual. The first departure from
this approach came when the Court conjured the "general and un-
perfected lien" doctrine, by which a section 3466 priority could de-
feat antedating statutory liens which were not specific and per-
fected; that is, the competing statutory lien was required to meet
each of the following tests: (1) the lienor must be identified, (2)
the amount of the lien must be certain, (3) the property subject
to the lien must be definite, and (4) the lien must be reduced to title
and possession.
In Security Trust, the Court required statutory lienors competing
with federal tax liens to meet the same tests of specificity and per-
fection. However, in New Britain, the Court finally conceded that
competing statutory liens were "specific" and "choate," although the
lienor had not reduced its claim to title and possession. But in White
Bear, the Court made it clear that the tests of specificity and perfec-
tion had not been abandoned, and it became patently clear that as
long as a statutory lien remained a lien, it could be defeated.
Construction of the tax lien statute justifies the application of the
"general and unperfected lien" doctrine to subordinate statutory
liens competing with the federal tax lien, and although there is no
similar justification in the language of section 3466, rather abstract
policy considerations tend to warrant application of the doctrine to
section 3466 litigation. However, there is no justification for apply-
ing the doctrine to subordinate contractual liens. In fact, application
of the tests of specificity and perfection imposed by the "general and
property" to which the Government's lien could have attached. See, e.g., Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. New York City Housing Authority, supra; Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Phil-
lips, 165 F. Supp. 335 (N.D. Iowa 1958); Central Sur. & Ins. Corp. v. Martin In-
fante Co., 164 F. Supp. 923 (D.N.J. 1958); Steelcraft Mfg. Co. v. Hewkin, 148 F.
Supp. 872 (E.D. Ill. 1956); Colusa-Glena Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Phoenix Ins. Co.,
145 F. Supp. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1956); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Miller, 143
F. Supp. 941 (W.D.N.C. 1954).
One writer has interpreted the Ball decision to mean that "practically every typo
of interest acquired in property, except a mere lien without more, will place the ac-
quirer in a position of riority over a tax lien, provided that the right is acquired and
perfected under state law in accordance with appropriate recording statutes before
the filing of notice of the tax lien." 10 ALA. L. REv. 462, 466-67 (1958). This
appears to say too much. If the language includes statutory liens, the assertion that
such interests may prevail over subsequently filed federal tax liens merely through
compliance with local recording statutes is clearly erroneous, for it neglects specific
holdings to the contrary. E.g., Illinois ex rel. Gordon v. Campbell, 329 U.S. 362, 374,
376 (1946). However, the above statement does imply that. even though a con-
tractual lien may be perfected within a specified grace period or a "reasonable time,"
a federal tax lien filed in the interval will take priority.
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unperfected lien" doctrine to contractual liens would do violence to
congressional intent and castigate recognized commercial transac-
tions.
In Ball, although the Company was clearly a "mortgagee" in
the commercial sense, it had failed to record its security instrument
or take any other steps to protect its lien against the claims of subse-
quent creditors or assignees of Jacobs. For this reason, the Company's
lien was not even perfected in the commercial sense. Because of the
latent and dangerous effects created by applying the "general and
unperfected lien" doctrine to legitimate security transactions, the
Court probably applied commercial tests of perfection to the Com-
pany/s lien. Thus, by referring to the Company's lien as "inchoate
and unperfected," the Court probably indicated that contractual
liens must be "commercially" perfected before the holder of a non-
possessory contractual lien is deemed a "mortgagee" entitled to the
protection of notice-filing. And unless a nonpossessory, contractual
lien has been perfected by filing before a federal tax lien is ified, the
latter will be given priority.
The rationale of decisions from Spokane County to Ball appear
to be easily separable into two distinct rules: (1) if the competing
lien is statutory, it is normally perfected by reducing it to a final
judgment, and unless this act has been performed before a federal
priority arises or before federal tax liens are filed, the Government's
claim will be given priority; (2) if the competing lien is contractual,
it is normally perfected either by filing the security interest or by
taking possession of the secured property, and either act, accom-
plished before a federal tax lien is filed, is sufficient to perfect the
former for tax purposes, entitling the holder to protection of notice-
filing as a "mortgagee" or "pledgee."
